

Message Text

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PAGE 01 NATO 06442 01 OF 03 051807Z
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USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 L-03
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NATO 06442

GENEVA FOR FLOWERREE, CCD DEL

E.O.11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PFOR

SUBJECT: NATO CONSULTATIONS ON CW

REF: (A) USNATO 6335 (NOTAL), (B) GENEVA 5402 (NOTAL)

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SUMMARY: AT JULY 1 POLADS CONSULTATIONS WITH EXPERTS ON
CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, US EXPERT (FLOWERREE)
DESCRIBED US APPROACH TO US-SOVIET CW TALKS, TO BEGIN IN
GENEVA ABOUT JULY 6, AND KEY ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE CW ARMS
CONTROL AGREEMENT THAT THE US WILL PRESENT TO THE SOVIETS
AT THAT TIME. ALLIED EXPERTS EVIDENCED PARTICULAR INTEREST
IN VERIFICATION PROBLEMS AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR CCD WORK ON
CW AND FURTHER ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON THIS OVER COMING
MONTHS WHILE US-SOVIET TALKS ARE UNDERWAY. FRG EXPERT
(HAUBER) MADE DETAILED PRESENTATION ON FRG CONCERNS,
STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS ON CW, NEED
TO TAKE ALLIANCE AND FRG CONCERNS INTO CONSIDERATION IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 06442 01 OF 03 051807Z

US-SOVIET TALKS, AND NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITION AND
MANDATORY ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. UK EXPERT (BURNS) RAISED
TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND NOTED UK DESIRE TO COOPERATE IN
MANAGING CCD DISCUSSION OF CW IN WAY THAT WOULD SUPPORT US-
SOVIET TALKS. UK AND FRG, WHOSE INTEREST IN SUBJECT WAS
EVIDENCED BY PRESENCE OF FIVE EXPERTS EACH, AND OTHER
ALLIED REPS EXPRESSED GREAT APPRECIATION FOR US WILLINGNESS

TO CONSULT FULLY, EARLIER CIRCULATION TO ALLIES OF US "ELEMENTS", FOR INTENTION OF US TO DEVELOP WITH THE SOVIETS PRINCIPLES TO BE PRESENTED TO THE CCD FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN TREATY LANGUAGE, AND ALSO FOR EXTENSIVE RESPONSES TO THEIR TECHNICAL QUESTIONS PROVIDED BY FLOWERREE. END SUMMARY.

1. UK POLAD NOTED AT THE OUTSET THAT FLOWERREE'S BRIEFING, FOLLOWING WARNKE'S BRIEFING JUNE 27 ON INDIAN OCEAN, CTB, AND SALT TALKS, WAS THE FOURTH ARMS CONTROL SUBJECT PRESENTED BY THE US TO THE ALLIES IN ONE WEEK, AN ADMIRABLE RECORD.

2. FLOWERREE PROVIDED INITIAL PRESENTATION ON BACKGROUND TO US REVIEW OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS POLICY ISSUES AND ON 14 KEY ELEMENTS FOR POSSIBLE CW AGREEMENT CIRCULATED TO ALLIES JUNE 16, WHICH US PLANS TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS SHORTLY AFTER THE BEGINNING OF CCD SESSION.

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3. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS BY BURNS (UK), FLOWERREE COMMENTED ON LIKELY SOVIET RECTIONS TO US ELEMENTS, NOTING THAT THE SOVIETS HAD IN EARLIER TECHNICAL TALKS PLACED GREAT STRESS ON NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS BUT INDICATED SOME WILLINGNESS ALSO TO CONSIDER OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION. AS TO REASON FOR US PROPOSAL FOR DESTRUCTION PERIOD LASTING EIGHT YEARS AND LIKELIHOOD THAT SOVIETS WOULD AGREE, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 06442 01 OF 03 051807Z

FLOWERREE SAID THAT EIGHT YEARS WAS TIME NEEDED FOR ORDERLY DESTRUCTION OF OUR STOCKS. SOVIETS HAD EARLIER MENTIONED A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS WHICH IN US VIEW WOULD SUFFICE ONLY IF MAJOR ADDITIONAL RESOURCES WERE DEVOTED TO THIS EFFORT OR IF SOVIETS HAD IN MIND DESTRUCTION OF RELATIVELY SMALL QUANTITIES. ON VERIFICATION, FLOWERREE NOTED THAT WE ANTICIPATED DEVELOPING PROCEDURES FOR REGULAR, PERIODIC INSPECTIONS OF DECLARED PRODUCTION FACILITIES. AS TO WHETHER SPECIAL TOXICITY STANDARDS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR PSYCHO-CHEMICAL AGENTS, FLOWERREE SAID THESE MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS INCAPACITANTS. BURNS EMPHASIZED UK APPRECIATION FOR US TO DEVELOP PRINCIPLES WITH SOVIETS, DESPITE SOVIET DESIRE TO NEGOTIATE TREATY LANGUAGE BILATERALLY, AND THOUGHT THAT US AND SOVIETS MIGHT AGREE ON "BITS OF LANGUAGE" IN CONNECTION WITH SOME PRINCIPLES THAT WOULD BE PRESENTED TO THE CCD. RECALLING THAT UK CW CONVENTION WAS ALREADY BEFORE CCD, BURNS SAID ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO MANAGE CW DISCUSSIONS THIS SUMMER IN WAY THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE US INITIATIVE AND NOT PERMIT NON-ALIGNED INTEREST IN CW NEGOTIATIONS OR ITALIAN WORKING GROUP PROPOSAL TO GET TOO FAR AHEAD OF PACE OF US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS. BURNS SAID THAT THE UK IS PREPARING A WORKING PAPER ON CW PROPHYLAXIS

WHICH WILL BE INTRODUCED LATER IN THE CCD SESSION. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT NEAR END OF SESSION CW INFORMALS WITH EXPERTS MIGHT BE HELD TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS RELATED TO SETTING UP A WORKING GROUP.

4. HAUBER SAID HIS AUTHORITIES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO NATO CONSULTATIONS ON CW. NOTING THAT US-SOVIET CW TALKS WOULD DEAL WITH ISSUES DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO ALLIED SECURITY, HAUBER EXPRESSED VIEW THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD AGREE ON PRINCIPLES PRIOR TO US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE FRG TERRITORY WOULD BE DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY ANY USE OF CW, FRG BELIEVED THAT ANY CW AGREEMENT SHOULD REDUCE RATHER THAN INCREASE

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NATO 06442 02 OF 03 051815Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 L-03
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 NATO 06442

MILITARY RISKS IN CW AREA.

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5. HAUBER REVIEWED FRG PROPOSED CW ARMS CONTROL PRINCIPLES, PRESENTED IN MARCH TO US AND NATO ALLIES (STATE 49286), AND CIRCULATED TALKING POINTS TRANSMITTED AT THE END OF THIS MESSAGE. STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF ASSURED VERIFICATION AND HIS DOUBTS REGARDING EFFICACY OF CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS, HAUBER SUGGESTED IN US PRINCIPLE 7 SPECIFYING THAT ON-SITE VERIFICATION WOULD BE "MANDATORY" AND THAT EVENTUAL INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION ON FLEXIBLE SCHEDULE PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED. NOTING THAT SOVIETS MIGHT POSSESS AS MUCH AS 2-3 HUNDRED THOUSAND TONS OF CW MUNITIONS AND THAT FAILURE TO DESTROY ANY SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF THIS QUANTITY COULD LEAVE SOVIETS WITH

IMPRESSIVE CAPACITY, HAUBER SUPPORTED US SUGGESTION THAT STATES MAKE EARLY GENERAL DECLARATIONS OF CEW AGENT AND MUNITIONS STOCKPILES, PERHAPS AT TIME OF SIGNATURE, SINCE DECLARATION BY THE USSR WOULD OBVIOUSLY AFFECT DECISION ON RATIFICATION. HAUBER SUGGESTED UTILITY OF STEP-BY-STEP DESTRUCTION, AND PERHAPS INTERRUPTING DESTRUCTION AT THE CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NATO 06442 02 OF 03 051815Z

END OF FOUR YEARS TO ASSESS CONFIDENCE AND VERIFICATION CAPABILITY AT THAT STAGE, RATHER THAN PROCEEDING WITH AUTOMATIC DESTRUCTION WHICH COULD LEAVE THE WEST AT A DIS-ADVANTAGE. IN THIS REGARD, HE EXPRESSED SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT EFFICACY OF REVIEW CONFERENCE; SOME DIFFICULT QUESTIONS LIKE CW INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES COULD NOT BE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED IN REVIEW CONFERENCE CONTEXT. HAUBER BELIEVED CCD ACTIVITIES SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO INTERFERE WITH US-SOVIET TALKS. HE THOUGHT IT MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO GUARANTEE THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS FULLY CONSULTED AND THAT THE ALLIES HAD OPPORTUNITIES TO PROVIDE INPUTS ON WHAT WAS ESSENTIALLY AN EAST-WEST SECURITY ISSUE.

6. IN RESPONSE TO HAUBER'S POINTS, FLOWERREE NOTED US INTEREST IN DEVELOPING REGULARIZED PROCEDURES FOR VERIFICATION, NOTED IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET REACTION TO POSSIBILITY OF ON-SITES, SAID THE US HAD NOT YET DEVELOPED ALL DETAILS OF ITS POSITION ON VERIFICATION, BUT BELIEVED IT NECESSARY FIRST TO TEST SOVIET REACTIONS TO OUR GENERAL PROPOSALS. ON QUESTION RAISED BY HAUBER ON INSPECTING INSIDE FACTORIES, FLOWERREE NOTED THAT US PROPOSAL ENVISAGED CLOSING DOWN AND SEALING DECLARED FACILITIES AND THAT NEED FOR INSPECTING INSIDE FACILITIES WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT REVIEW CONFERENCE COULD BE USEFUL, DESPITE HAUBER'S RESERVATIONS. HE EMPHASIZED US WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT WITH THE ALLIES, AS APPROPRIATE, AT GENEVA AND POSSIBLY AT NATO, BUT ADDED THAT US PERSONNEL WERE STRETCHED THIN ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AT PRESENT.

7. ITALIAN EXPERT (FERRETTI) WELCOMED US INTENTION TO DEVELOP PRINCIPLES THAT WOULD BE PROVIDED TO THE CCD FOR NEGOTIATION, EXPRESSED INTEREST IN RETAINING CAPACITY FOR TESTING SMALL AMOUNTS OF CW IN LABORATORIES, AND CONTINUED CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 06442 02 OF 03 051815Z

PRODUCTION OF SOME INCAPACITANTS AND DUAL-PURPOSE AGENTS. NETHERLANDS EXPERT (SCHEFFERS) RAISED NUMBER OF TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND STRESSED NEED TO ENGAGE NON-ALIGNED

AT CCD IN CW DISCUSSIONS DURING THE SUMMER. HE BELIEVED THAT A WORKING GROUP, IN WHICH THE WEST COULD MANAGE THE PACE OF TALKS, MIGHT DEVELOP CW PRINCIPLES AT THE CCD WHILE PARALLEL US-SOVIET TALKS TOOK PLACE. BELGIAN EXPERT (CHAMPINOIS) NOTED PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO BELGIUM OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON CW AND STRESSED VIEW THAT INSPECTIONS BY CHALLENGE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT. CANADIAN REP, ON INSTRUCTIONS, NOTED VERIFICATION PROBLEMS, AND IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING SMALL QUANTITIES OF CW FOR DEFENSE STUDIES. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTION ABOUT TREATMENT OF RCAS, FLOWERREE SAID US INTENDED TO LEAVE RCAS ASIDE IN TALKS WITH SOVIETS.

8. IN CONCLUSION, HAUBER AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF CHAIRMAN AGAIN EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF CW CONSULTATIONS AT NATO WHERE MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS COULD BE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED AND ALLIED MILITARY AUTHORITIES COULD BE FULLY APPRISED ON US-SOVIET TALKS. CHAIRMAN NOTED POSSIBILITY OF CW CONSULTATIONS IN POLADS IN LATE JULY IN CONNECTION WITH CONSULTATIONS ON SSOD.

9. COMMENT: IN SUBSEQUENT PRIVATE CONTACTS, EXPERTS AND POLADS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH US PRESENTATION AND EXCELLENT CONSULTATION ON CW, AN IMPRESSION CONFIRMED BY INITIAL COMMENTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM PERMREPS.

10. BEGIN TEXT OF FRG TALKING POINTS:

WE ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CONCLUSION OF A CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WHICH SHOULD BE AS COMPREHENSIVE AS POSSIBLE AND SUFFICIENTLY VERIFIED.

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PAGE 01 NATO 06442 03 OF 03 051822Z
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00
USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 L-03
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 NATO 06442

BOTH THE FACT THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY UNDERTOOK IN 1954 NOT TO MANUFACTURE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND THAT THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, OWING TO ITS GEOSTRATEGIC POSITION, WOULD BE PRIMARILY AFFECTED IN THE EVENT OF EAST-WEST CHEMICAL WARFARE, EXPLAINS WHY IT IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN SECURING AN EFFECTIVE BAN ON SUCH WEAPONS.

HOWEVER, SUCH A CONVENTION WOULD APPEAR TO BE ONLY MEANINGFUL IF IT WERE TO REDUCE RATHER THAN INCREASE THE EXISTING MILITARY RISKS. IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THIS WILL BE THE CASE, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE OBSERVANCE OF THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES IS ESSENTIAL:

1. THE CONVENTION SHOULD COVER ALL SIGNIFICANT CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF THE SOVIET UNION. IN OTHER WORDS THE WEST MUST NOT BE PLACED AT A DISADVANTAGE AS REGARDS THE WEAPONS IN QUESTION. ON THIS POINT THERE APPEARS TO BE NO DIVERGENCE OF OPINION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 NATO 06442 03 OF 03 051822Z

2. THE VERIFICATION OF COMMITMENTS PRESCRIBED BY A CW CONVENTION SHOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE. WHERE WEAPONS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE HAVE BEEN CONCERNED THE WEST HAS ALWAYS BEEN ADAMANT ON THIS POINT. WE REALIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THERE CAN BE NO ABSOLUTELY SAFE VERIFICATION PROCEDURE, BUT WHATEVER MEASURES ARE AGREED THEY SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO GIVE THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE ENOUGH CONFIDENCE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION WILL BE OBSERVED BY THE OTHER SIDE. IN OUR VIEW A CW CONVENTION SHOULD STIPULATE NOT ONLY THE DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STOCKS BUT ALSO THE TERMINATION OF PRODUCTION, TO BE VERIFIED BY OBLIGATORY ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. A RESTRICTION TO INSPECTIONS ON CHALLENGE WOULD HAVE THE DISADVANTAGE THAT ANY SUCH REQUESTS FOR AN INSPECTION WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBSTANTIATED BY ASSERTIONS AND SUSPICIONS WHICH COULD PLACE A STRAIN ON RELATIONS BETWEEN CONTRACTING PARTIES. MOREOVER, SUCH SUSPICIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO SUBSTANTIATE IN RESPECT OF COUNTRIES WITH A CLOSED SOCIETY, WHOSE PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR MILITARY PURPOSES ARE FOR THE MOST PART UNKNOWN. WITH SUCH A VERIFICATION SYSTEM IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL TO RELY TOO HEAVILY ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF INTELLIGENCE. ALSO THE DISCOVERY OF PREPARATORY MEASURES AND EXERCISES WOULD HAVE ONLY LIMITED VERIFICATION VALUE SINCE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PROVE

WHETHER THEY ARE INTENDED FOR SUBSEQUENT USE OF C-WEAPONS OR EXCLUSIVELY FOR DEFENSIVE AND PROTECTIVE PURPOSES.

3. WITH THE NECESSARY STEP BY STEP IMPLEMENTATION OF A CW CONVENTION, IT SHOULD BE ENSURED AT ALL TIMES THAT THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN THE CW SECTOR IS NOT INCREASED TO NATO'S DISADVANTAGE. FOR THIS REASON WE FEEL THAT AN AUTOMATIC PROCEDURE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL AGENTS WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE. INDEED, IN A CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NATO 06442 03 OF 03 051822Z

FIRST PHASE PROVISION SHOULD MERELY BE MADE FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF CERTAIN QUANTITIES OF SUCH AGENTS. DESTRUCTION WOULD THEN HAVE TO BE CONTINUED AFTER THE PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION HAVE REVIEWED THE SITUATION FROM THE SECURITY POINT OF VIEW AND HAVE NO SERIOUS OBJECTIONS.

4. THE FACT THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO RESTOCK ARSENALS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS EVEN AFTER THE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF EXISTING STOCKS, AND THE UNCERTAINTIES INHERENT IN THE PRESENT MEANS OF VERIFICATION, REQUIRE THAT A CW CONVENTION DOES NOT IMPAIR THE MAINTENANCE OF DEFENSIVE AND PROTECTIVE MEASURES. END TEXT. BENNETT

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